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A Cognitive Pragmatic Review of Natural Discourse 
Ágnes Herczeg-Deli 
The central issue of this paper is the relation of discourse to its 
contextual background. First I will outline the concept of context in a 
cognitive pragmatic approach, and then I will explore how mental 
processes get involved with the “interpersonal plane of discourse” (the 
term is Sinclair’s, 1983). The extracts used for analysis were selected 
from recordings of natural conversations on BBC Radio, and they are 
meant to reveal linguistic and pragmatic factors that I assume to be 
determining components of the verbal interaction of the two 
participants at the current moment of the discourse. My research was 
qualitative, and the paper is basically expository, aiming at the 
observation of the emergence of discourse coherence in the light of 
relevance. 
1 Introduction 
Meaning in context has been investigated by philosophers and linguists from 
various aspects for over half a century now. Austin’s revelation of speech acts 
opened a door on meaning in actual communicational situations. Speech act 
analysis is concerned with utterances in terms of their potential force in the 
communication, i.e. with their function in a particular context, albeit within the 
framework of the theory there is no scope for the interpretation and definition of 
the concept of context. The social dimensions of a verbal communicational event 
are the concern of conversational analysis, which explores the organization of 
speaking turns, and the recognition of signals, verbal and non-verbal, that the 
participants exploit in the course of a conversation. The structure of discourse, 
the nature of its units and the functions of the participants’ acts in these units are 
the subject matter of discourse analysis (see Sinclair and Coulthard, 1975; 
Coulthard, 1977: 1985). 
The theoretical issues raised for the explanation of the production and 
interpretation of utterances are the concern of pragmatics; its goal is to account 
for some non-linguistic dimensions of linguistic ‘performance’ with focus on the 
force of an utterance in context and principles of language use. For the past 
twenty-odd years, however, pragmatics has moved from its original concern 
rooted in philosophy towards the field of cognitive science. Advocates of the 
cognitive approach to pragmatics and communication propose theories of how 
mental processes operating in the production and understanding of utterances 
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can be captured and described in a general framework (see Sperber and Wilson 
1986, 1995; Carston 2002a, 2002b). Due to its target and scope of interest, 
pragmatics illustrates theories mainly with invented data, and frequently, the 
examples are simple and goal-directed individual utterances. In this respect the 
validity of pragmatic explanations of language use may sound somewhat 
paradoxical. In order to think about discourse in a pragmatic frame there is an 
obvious need for investigations of natural language in a corpus-bound approach. 
Difficult as it is to trace mental processes in natural language, let alone in 
conversation, it should be a central issue for the analyst to reflect on such 
questions as: what is the basis for a valid decoding and verbal response to the 
thoughts and communicative intentions of the speaker in a natural 
communicative event? From another perspective: what is the nature of 
coherence in an exchange of a natural conversation? My assumption is that the 
surface linguistic phenomena of a discourse can give us cues to the cognitive 
processes in progress during the production and interpretation, and this paper is 
meant to explore these cues. 
2 The form–function dichotomy 
In a number of cases the form of the utterance is supposed to guarantee the 
discourse function; the grammar can be a token for the hearer to infer the 
speaker’s intention. However, as it was first proved by speech act specialists, 
form does not serve as the only signal of function. Discourse analysts also point 
out that conversation cannot be given a meaningful structural description based 
on the four major sentence types; at the same time, we have to face the fact that 
the functional units of discourse are realized by these four grammatical options. 
What is possible in discourse analysis is “to provide a meaningful structure in 
terms of Question and Answer, Challenge and Response, Invitation and 
Acceptance” (Coulthard 1985, 7). Labov (1972) emphasizes that it is most 
important to distinguish between what is said and what is done, and he sketches 
rules for interpretation. These rules, however, do not make reference to how the 
actual forms of the speaker’s utterances are conditioned. Grice (1975) subscribes 
to the Labovian observation about the possible difference between ‘saying’ 
something and ‘doing something’ by it, and introduces the term implicature to 
explain how the force of an indirect utterance can be represented. He assumes 
that inferencing by listeners is essential for interpretation, and that “the presence 
of a conversational implicature must be capable of being worked out” (1975:50). 
He also suggests that the participants of a conversation have an orientation to be 
co-operative and are supposed to follow basically four principles in the areas of 
quality, quantity, relevance and manner (ibid., 45–6). Supporting the Gricean 
theory of inferencing Sperber and Wilson’s discussion of communication 
processes emphasizes the observation that pragmatic interpretation goes well 
beyond decoding (1986; 1995). They propose a new theoretical framework for 
an explanation of comprehension, setting out from the assumption that human 
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cognition tends to seek relevance in communication, which is an essential 
contextual factor of interpretation processes. In their later work they argue that 
interpretation mechanisms of inferential comprehension are metapsychological 
through and through (Sperber and Wilson 2002b). They support the view that 
inferencing involves „the construction and evaluation of a hypothesis about the 
communicator’s meaning on the basis of evidence she has provided for this 
purpose” (2002b:9). 
Natural discourse clearly shows that linguistic straightforwardness is not a 
must in communication. Carston makes a justifiable note about communication 
saying that “the majority of our exchanges are implicature-laden” (2002a:145), 
and yet, our experience is that it is relatively infrequent that the hearer 
misunderstands the speaker’s meaning. This fact allows us to presume that in 
natural discourse there are some contextual factors continually available to the 
hearer, other than the grammatical form of an utterance, which control the 
interpretation process and the hearer’s consequent linguistic behaviour. 
In view of the crucial role of the contextual factors in comprehension, in the 
following part of the paper on the one hand I will be concerned with the concept 
of the context and those factors of it that induce the intended meaning or allow 
the hearer’s meaning. On the other hand, I will see whether there are felicitous 
lexical signals in the speaker’s utterance of the intended meaning. These issues 
are expected to provide for some answers as to what are the conditions for the 
hearer to interpret his partner’s utterance when it is not straightforward in form, 
and also to respond in a way satisfying the pragmatic principles of 
cooperativeness. 
The investigation will be cognitive-pragmatically oriented. First of all, the 
concepts of context, knowledge, and relevance will be discussed, for I assume 
that it is through these concepts that some ‘unarticulated’ constituents of a 
discourse event can be elucidated. In section 4.2 the analyses of discourse 
extracts aim at a discovery of the discourse acts realized by pragmatically 
interpretable schemata and their lexical - conceptual maps. The extracts used for 
illustration come from natural conversations on BBC Radio. 
3 Interpretation and context 
In pragmatic literature the context is usually characterized as indispensable for 
the identification of meaning, but its concept is frequently left undefined. Givón 
(2005) finds that since the pivotal year of the publication of Austin’s How to Do 
Things with Words (1962) pragmatics has proven itself both indispensible and 
frustrating: 
“Indispensable because almost every facet of our construction of 
reality, most conspicuously in matters of culture, sociality and 
communication, turns out to hinge upon some contextual pragmatics. 
Frustrating because almost every encounter one has with context opens 
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up the slippery slope of relativity”, and “everything is 100 percent 
context-dependent” (2005:xiii). 
In line with Givón’s assessment of context we have to admit that due to its non-
objective nature, the concept of context is particularly troublesome to define. 
Sinclair and Coulthard (1975:28) define their ‘context of situation’ as “all 
relevant factors in the environment, social conventions and the shared 
experience of the participants”, but they do not go beyond this general statement. 
Van Dijk’s view about the relationship between discourse and context is that one 
needs to distinguish between the actual situations of utterances in all their 
multiplicity of features, and the selection of only those features that are 
linguistically and culturally relevant to the production of utterances (1977). In 
his later work van Dijk advances a socio-cognitive description of context by 
providing a mental model embedded into a social context and situation (2005; 
2006). 
Ochs (1979:1) points out that the scope of context includes ‘the social and 
the psychological world in which the language user operates at any given time’ 
and he explains that all this involves “the language user’s beliefs and 
assumptions about temporal and social settings, prior, ongoing and future actions 
(verbal, non-verbal), and the state of knowledge and attentiveness of those 
participating in the social interaction in hand” (ibid., 5). 
Leech (1983) argues that meaning in language use combines semantic and 
pragmatic aspects. His ‘general pragmatics’ has a combinatory character in the 
sense that he is both concerned with ‘pragmalinguistics’, which is related to 
grammar, and ‘socio-pragmatics’ which he relates to sociology. He includes 
context in the criteria of meaning in speech situations, and notes that it has been 
understood in various ways, “for example to include ‘relevant’ aspects of the 
physical and social setting of an utterance” (1983:13). He considers it “to be any 
background knowledge assumed to be shared by s and h,” speaker and hearer, 
“and which contributes to h’s interpretation of what s means by a given 
utterance” (Leech 1983:13). The ‘problem-solving’ procedures of planning and 
interpreting on the speaker’s and on the hearer’s part, respectively, Leech 
suggests, “involve general human intelligence assessing alternative probabilities 
on the basis of contextual evidence” (ibid., 36). 
Coulter (1994) challenges some ‘deconstructionist’, ‘objectivist’ arguments 
about contextuality, and argues for any minimally intelligible text “to possess 
certain self-explicating features due to the inter-articulation of its conceptual 
devices, a parallel to the gestalt-contexture character of situations, rules and 
conduct in everyday life” (ibid., 689, italics as in the original). 
Cognitive pragmatic approaches to communication regard the context as a 
mental phenomenon which is essentially dynamic in character. Similarly to van 
Dijk (1977) or to Ochs (1979), Sperber and Wilson (1986) see the context as a 
psychological construct in the communication process which is controlled by 
knowledge as well as by the co-text, two factors which change from moment to 
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moment. They also propose that the participants make selections from a variety 
of possible interpretations at every crucial point of the discourse, and that the 
possible choices involve shared assumptions about the world between the 
speaker and hearer (cf. Sperber & Wilson 1986:14–7). By advocating this view 
Sperber & Wilson assume that for the hearer the context constitutes not only the 
immediate physical environment or the meanings of the immediately preceding 
utterances, but “expectations about the future, scientific hypotheses or religious 
beliefs, anecdotal memories, general cultural assumptions, beliefs about the 
mental state of the speaker, may all play a role in interpretation”, too (1986:14–
5). Thus in the interpretation process of “each item of new information many 
different sets of assumptions from diverse sources (long-term memory, short-
term memory, perception) might be selected as context” (1986:138). To refer to 
the psychological process Sperber and Wilson coin the term context selection, 
and the relevance of an utterance is defined in the theory in terms of contextual 
effect. Sperber and Wilson argue that newly presented information is relevant to 
the hearer “when its processing in a context of available assumptions yields a 
POSITIVE COGNITIVE EFFECT” (2002a:251, full capitals as in the original), 
and that the greater the contextual effect, the greater the relevance of the 
utterance. One type of cognitive effect is CONTEXTUAL IMPLICATION, 
while other types of it include the strengthening, revision or abandonment of 
available assumptions (ibid.). 
3.1 Knowledge: a feature of the context, or context: a feature of knowledge 
Some cognitivists emphasize that in communication social meaning and context 
are conceived of as internal rather than external phenomena (Marmaridou 
2000:13; Fetzer 2004:226; van Dijk 2005; 2006). Likewise, van Dijk (2006), in a 
broad multidisciplinary approach, considers context a “participant construct”. 
Fetzer (2004:3, 164) points out that the connectedness between a linguistic 
expression and its context, in another psychological approach, viz. gestalt 
psychology, can be considered in terms of the figure–ground distinction as 
figure and ground, respectively. According to this approach the ground 
represents context or common ground, which is generally assumed to denote 
knowledge, beliefs and suppositions that are shared, while figure, viz. the 
phenomenon being investigated, stands for the linguistic expression with which 
it is connected. 
In a cognitive understanding of context knowledge is a central concept. The 
context is a composite psychological construct which entails awareness of the 
physical environment of the communicational situation and familiarity with 
socio-cultural aspects of pragmatic meaning, managed by the participants’ 
various mental faculties. In this approach, abilities of retrieving the valid 
knowledge structures – scripts and schemata – from the memory, skills of 
reasoning and association are part of the context (cf. Sperber and Wilson 1986). 
Knowledge is basically implicit, but presupposed. From the principle of co-
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operativeness (Grice 1975) it also follows that assumed knowledge between the 
participants is crucial; without a sufficient amount of shared knowledge between 
the participants efficient communication cannot take place. 
The essence of the interdependence of context and the mind can be framed 
in the following motto: the context is actually in the mind and the mind is in 
the context (see Herczeg-Deli 2009a:105). 
3.2 Interpretation and relevance 
The speaker’s meaning cannot be coded in a linguistically explicit form, hence 
hearers have to be able to work out implied meanings. In communication valid 
inferences are achieved on the basis of knowledge through cognitive operations. 
Sperber and Wilson’s theory (1986; 1995) proposes that all the pragmatic factors 
and processes that operate in communication can be explicated within the 
framework of one cognitive phenomenon, which they term relevance after Grice 
(see Sperber & Wilson 1986, 1995; Wilson & Sperber 2004; Smith & Wilson 
1992). 
The core of the theory is Grice’s proposal that “communication is 
successful not when hearers recognise the linguistic meaning of the utterance, 
but when they infer the speaker’s ‘meaning’ from it” (Sperber & Wilson 
1986:23). A further point of Wilson and Sperber is that the decoding phase of 
utterance interpretation provides only input to an inferential phase “in which a 
linguistically encoded logical form is contextually enriched and used to 
construct a hypothesis about the speaker’s informative intention” (Wilson and 
Sperber 1993:1). The theory proposes that in a communication situation every 
utterance creates an expectation of relevance worth of the listener’s attention and 
consideration: “any external stimulus or internal representation which provides 
an input to cognitive processes may be relevant to an individual at some time”, 
as the search for relevance is a basic feature of human cognition (Sperber & 
Wilson 2002a:250). Thus, every utterance conveys a presumption of its own 
relevance. This claim is called the Second, or Communicative, Principle of 
Relevance, and the authors argue that it is the key to inferential comprehension 
(cf. Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995, chapter 3; 2002b). Contradicting Grice 
(1975), advocates of Relevance Theory emphasize that “relevance is 
fundamental to communication not because speakers obey a maxim of relevance, 
but because relevance is fundamental to cognition” (Smith & Wilson, 1992:2). 
In a relevance-theoretic approach the basis of the explanation of how 
communication happens is the assumption that for successful communication 
utterances in discourse are supposed to be relevant to the context. My 
interpretation of context is that it involves a multiplicity of physical, social and 
psychological factors, of which the latter play a crucial role. An utterance is 
motivated by the speaker’s need and her goal in the immediate linguistic or non-
linguistic context, and the hearer, potential speaker B, is assumed to be able to 
interpret this goal, i.e. speaker’s meaning, applying his knowledge and information 
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available for him in the context. Both decoded and inferred meanings are the 
result of mental processes involving various factors of the context which include 
the participants’ intelligence, awareness, knowledge, as well as his logical and 
verbal skills. In my view lack of knowledge or insufficient knowledge, just like 
uncertainty also have to be considered part of the psychological context, as these 
mental states can serve as motivation for elicitations for information or 
confirmation in a conversation (cf. Herczeg-Deli 2009a). 
No context can be analysed by compositional parsing. Its psychological 
component emerges as a result of interacting mental processes constructed and 
negotiated all through the communication, and at the same time it has control 
over the process of the communication. The following figure, a modified version 
of the figure in Herczeg-Deli 2009a:106, is meant to be a schematic illustration 
of the processes of production and interpretation of an utterance in discourse as 
conditioned by the context: 
 
 
 
need 
intended meaning 
(message) 
SPEAKER B:
Broader circumstances (code, culture) 
Immediate circumstances:
 
choice of linguistic form 
– physical factors (location) 
– social factors (time, co-participants)
Psychological factors:
– the speaker’s goal, will, 
– the participants’  
KNOWLEDGE potentials
(information pool, memory, 
real knowledge and lack of knowledge, 
beliefs and assumptions, expectations, 
cognitive capacities, logical skills, 
experience)
– linguistic environment (preceding 
discourse)
interpreted meaning
DECODING 
INFERENCE-MAKING 
SELECTION 
observing relevance
INTERPRETATION 
RESPONSE 
SPEAKER A:
motivation 
CONTEXT 
 
 
Fig. 1. Production and interpretation in discourse
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From the empiricist perspective there may be arguments against a cognitive 
interpretation of the context reasoning that mental states are too private to be 
detectable, and that there are no clear empirical data available for a study of 
what goes on in a mind. In another point of view, however, it is sensible to 
assume that even if we don’t know exactly what neural processes are going on in 
the brain, we can make some hypotheses about how interpretation emerges. A 
close linguistic analysis of natural discourse, the investigation of its lexico-
grammatical properties usually provides cues for some ‘inconspicuous’ 
cognitive factors obtaining in the local interpretation. This can also permit 
assumptions about some schemas and mental processes involved in the 
discourse. My research and observations about discourse processes are in 
accordance with the following assumptions made by van Dijk and by Levinson:  
i) “contexts are not observable – but their consequences are” (van Dijk 
2006:163), and 
ii) certain „aspects of linguistic structure sometimes directly encode (or 
otherwise interact with) features of the context” (Levinson 1983:8). 
4. Relevance in discourse 
In the following part of the paper linguistic evidence will be found of some 
ongoing cognitive processes and of the operation of relevance in natural 
discourse. 
I assume that relevance in a discourse exchange is conditioned by the 
following contextual factors: 
 
a.  Hearer’s inferences regarding Speaker’s linguistic behaviour satisfy 
Hearer’s expectations of a relevant act in the communication event. 
 
b.  This judgment about the suitability of Speaker’s utterance(s) in the current 
context serves as a basis for Hearer’s processing of the stimulus as well as 
for her/his response. 
 
Proper interpretation leads to a relevant response, or, looking at it from the other 
end of the process: the proof of the positive cognitive effect of Speaker’s 
utterance is a response from Hearer accepted by Speaker as relevant. In the light 
of the theory Hearer’s interpretation can be considered the function of an 
utterance understood in terms of its relevance in its context. 
4.1 Socio-cultural aspects of the data 
Analysing talk in institutional settings or in public contexts such as talk radio 
shows requires consideration of certain contextual factors which are not a 
component part in other kinds of natural discourse when, for instance, the 
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participants have a private conversation. In radio discourse the listeners are not 
simply eavesdroppers, but the target audience, which is a relevant factor of the 
context. The goal of a talk show is to induce the guest to contribute to the 
success of the conversation with a considerable amount of information about 
him/herself, and to allow a third party to listen in. Due to the characteristics of 
the genre the conversational partners have to restrict themselves to their 
communicational roles: the host asks questions and the invited guest answers. In 
this respect the participants are not equal, and their discourse strategies are 
predetermined accordingly. Participation in such conversations also shows some 
asymmetry: the host speaks less, as it is the guest who has to be in the focus of 
attention. These controlling factors of the context are, of course, all in the 
cognitions of the participants. As regards other types of discourse I assume that 
in terms of the intentions, communicational strategies and the mental processes 
behind these show similar, if not the same, general properties. 
4.2 Interpreting the speaker’s meaning: the observable and the 
unobservable 
Natural discourse manifests a lot of observable properties. An investigation of 
the linguistic realization can provide us with cues for some of the mental 
processes generating it, and it also allows for assumptions about contextual 
prerequisites for the interpretation. Stubbs (2001:443) notes that “what is said is 
merely a trigger: a linguistic fragment which allows hearers to infer a 
schema….”, also pointing out that communication would be impossible without 
the assumptions which are embodied in schemata. This part of the paper will be 
devoted to the analysis of some discourse extracts from a cognitive pragmatic 
perspective as it follows from my views of context, knowledge and relevance 
discussed in sections 3.1, 3.2 and 4 above. 
In the following extract speaker A is the host of the talk show, late John 
Dunn, one of the best-known voices in his time on BBC2, and B is his special 
guest, Keith Waterhouse (died in 2009), newspaper columnist for the Daily 
Mirror until 1988 and thereafter for the Daily Mail, writer of a newspaper style 
book. The time of the interview is 31st October 1989. 
 
(1) A1: But they must have you must have been accused # from many 
quarters of turning your coat, surely. 
 B1:  [ə] # Well, I hadn’t all that much because [ə] [ə] the column 
was there but it still got barbed wire around it. [əm] # Nobody 
can touch it. It’s the same column, # you know. As I said to 
Captain Bob I’m simply # moving from the Palladium to the 
Colosseum. It’s the same act. It’s like Max Wall. 
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 A2: (laughs) # You’re your column is inviolate  if if     no one’s 
B bch: yes 
 ~A2: allowed to touch a single thing on it. 
B2:  No, no, ‘t was too valuable to me. 
 A3: Somebody just can’t get at it. 
 B3:  No. 
 A (laughs) 
 B (laughs) 
 
To respond appropriately speaker B has to grasp the relevance of the first 
speaker’s words, and find out his intention. For the latter, in the context 
described above familiarity with the character of the programme, the participant 
roles and the goal of the host serve as a plausible cue: A’s job is to ask, and for 
interpretation the linguistic form has to be measured against the Hearer’s, B’s, 
assumption about this goal. A’s accepting attitude (see turns A2 and A3) towards 
the response is proof of B’s proper “context selection” (see Sperber and Wilson 
1986). The indirect form used by A had a “positive cognitive effect” (Sperber 
and Wilson 2002a): his partner interpreted it as Elicitation for Confirmation 
and/or for Information. The epistemic modality represented by the auxiliary must 
has the contextual implication of the speaker’s strong hypothesis concerning a 
Situation B may have experienced. As regards their function, my data show that 
Hypothetical utterances in an Initiation Move of a discourse exchange typically 
elicit some kind of Evaluation of the assumed situation submitted by the speaker 
in the proposition. The hypothetical situation then is either accepted as true or 
rejected as false by the communicational partner. Rejections are generally 
supported by some Reason, some explanation or details of reality, as in our case 
above. 
In the interpretation process the Hearer’s further cognitive task is contextual 
meaning selection for the lexical units in the Speaker’s utterance, by considering 
relevant contextual information. The referents of the indexicals and the noun 
phrases in discourse have to be activated in the memory of the participants or 
selected on the grounds of the available contextual information. There is a good 
reason for us to think that in extract (1) the referents of the personal pronoun 
they were identified by B without difficulty, in spite of the fact that after a short 
consideration speaker A changed his initial linguistic choice for a passive 
structure. Due to the context selection going on in the minds of the participants 
such kind of vagueness does not necessarily disrupt mutual understanding, or 
cause communicative failure, and from the preceding discourse even the 
listeners of the programme can infer a plausible meaning: A probably had B’s 
colleagues working for the Daily Mirror in mind, where B had his previous job. 
As this is not a crucial topic in the process of interaction, the interviewer’s 
change for the noun phrase many quarters does not sound misinterpretable 
either. Contextual knowledge is a guarantee for proper sense selection for 
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quarters. The interpretation obviously requires the abandonment of several of 
the possible context-independent meanings such as one of four parts, fifteen 
minutes, a part of a town, an American or Canadian coin, and in the current 
context in A’s rerun it possibly involved the broadening of the possible circle of 
the referents of the pronoun they to many others who the speaker could not or 
did not want to name. No referent has to be identified for the noun phrase your 
coat, as for anybody who speaks good English it is inferable that the speaker 
uses it in the metaphorical sense in an idiom, in which the verb turn is also used 
in the abstract sense, and it would not be plausible to associate the situation with 
the law court either just because the verb accused appears in the discourse. 
The response in Move B1 entails a lot of diverse sources of assumed 
common knowledge, too. From B’s profession, which is journalism, contextual 
information is available for the proper selection of the meaning of the noun 
column excluding the possibility of reference to a tall cylinder which is usually 
part of a building, to a group of people or animals moving in a line or to a 
vertical section of a printed text. The selection of the metaphorical meaning of 
barbed wire around it is a plausible corollary of the contextual meaning of the 
noun column, and it is this metaphor that allocates the verb touch an abstract 
meaning. B’s discourse presupposes a common cultural background for the 
interpretation of the proper nouns the Palladium and the Colosseum, and 
similarly, for his reference to Captain Bob and Max Wall. The assumed 
knowledge that the two names, the former of which was a nickname dubbed by 
him, speaker B personally, refer to one and the same famous English comedian, 
and the context in which the speaker associates himself with him is exploited as 
a source of humour, which is appreciated by his host, and potentially by the 
audience, with laughter. 
Speaker A’s reaction in the Follow-up Move, A2 and A3, is an excellent 
example of contextual inference, which he made on the grounds of B’s 
explanation of his circumstances. It emerges as a kind of summary, a 
reformulation of the assumed essence of speaker B’s words: your column is 
inviolate if if no one’s allowed to touch a single thing on it. Somebody just can’t 
get at it, which B accepts as a valid interpretation (B2 and B3), and gives a 
logical Reason: ‘t was too valuable to me. 
The first exchange of the extract, A1–B1, shows a discourse pattern which 
Winter (1982; 1994) identifies as a frequently occurring semantic structure in 
written text: the Hypothetical–Real, a cognitive schema, which also commonly 
emerges in conversations (cf. also Deli 2004; Deli 2006; Herczeg-Deli 2009a).  
The analysis of the short discourse above permits the conclusion that the 
following are essential contextual factors for interpretation: 
• awareness of the situation, the goal of the discourse and of the 
participant roles 
• knowledge of the subject matter of the discourse 
• knowledge of the relevant socio-cultural environment 
• linguistic knowledge 
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• logical skills and abilities for sense-selection observing relevance 
• knowledge of relevant cognitive schemas. 
 
In the characterization of natural discourse exchanges some of the cognitive 
perspectives of the context are fairly easily identifiable. The discourse attributes 
of extract (1) e.g. can be summarised as follows: 
 
Participant roles: Host = interviewer (A) Guest = interviewee (B) 
Contextually assumed 
intentions: 
Seeking information/ 
confirmation 
Giving information 
Discourse moves: Initiation Response 
Discourse functions of 
utterances: 
Elicitation Giving information/ 
confirmation 
Cognitive operations:  
in A1–B1 Assumption Rejection (+ Reason) 
in A2–B2 Assumption (inferred) Acceptance 
in A3–B3 Assumption (reformulated) Acceptance 
Emerging discourse schemas: 
in A1–B1  Hypothetical —  Real 
in A2–B2  Evaluation —  Evaluation 
in A3–B3   
 
Table 1. The discourse attributes of extract (1) 
 
Communicative goals can be achieved by various linguistic forms, which can be 
detected in natural speech via insight into the speaker’s discourse planning 
process. The following extract reveals how the first speaker, after deliberating as 
to which linguistic form to chose for his information seeking Elicitation, decides 
on a Hypothetical Evaluation, reinforced by a tag question: 
(2) A: But [C\the idea [hh\# it is quite important, actually, when you think 
about it that a newspaper should have # a universal style. I mean 
it would look a bit silly if it printed recognize in one place with a 
‘zed’ and one place with an  
‘ess’+wouldn’t it? 
B: Yes,  but [əm]    some [ən] [ən] [ən] I think what’s more [hm] 
important is that a newspaper should have a good # 
recognizable [ə:] voice. And the idea of this # thing was that 
was that when I # first came to to [ə:] [ə] work in popular 
journalism # [ə] we # used to talk in in [ə] what my [k] [ə] 
guru, Hugh Cudlip would, you know, one of the founding fathers 
of the Daily Mirror called good, clear doorstep English. [ə] you 
It was the language of the people, you know, it was the language 
the people spoke themselves…………… 
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In this context the question tag at the end of A’s Elicitation is obviously not 
crucial for the interpretation, which is clear from the fact that B starts responding 
before the question is uttered. The Hypothetical proposition reflecting the 
speaker’s assumption does its job; just like in extract (1), it elicits a response, by 
which the Hypothetical–Real schema emerges. Here it is interlinked with the 
schema of Evaluation–Evaluation, and combines with some specification of the 
contextually Unspecific and Specific. 
Winter (1992 and elsewhere) and Hoey (1983) identify a semantic 
relationship between textual elements which they label the Unspecific–Specific 
or the General–Particular pattern, respectively. Probing such textual units Hoey 
(ibid.) distinguishes between two varieties: Preview–Detail and Generalization–
Example, and points out that in their identification the context plays a crucial 
role. Specification is a commonly occurring cognitive process in spoken 
discourse, too (see Deli 2004; 2006, Herczeg-Deli 2009a; 2009b). After Winter I 
tag the cognitive relationship between two discourse units in which the second 
gives details about the local interpretation of the first the contextually 
Unspecific–Specific schema. 
Table 2 below is meant to display the lexical cues of the cognitive schemas 
that are identifiable in the two moves of exchange (2): 
 
MOVES HYPOTHETICAL EVALUATION REAL 
Initiation:   it is quite important   
  when you think      
  should have  a universal style   
  it would look a bit silly   
  
if it printed...with a 
[zed]     
  
                 ...with an 
[ess]     
Response: I think more important UNSPECIFIC 
    
a good, recognizable 
voice 
a good, clear doorstep 
English 
      SPECIFIC 
      the language of the people 
      
the language the people 
spoke themselves 
 
Table 2. The conceptual map of exchange (2) 
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As can be worked out from this conceptual map, for his response the second 
speaker interprets the first speaker’s Hypothetical Evaluation as an Elicitation 
for Evaluation, of which the cue concept is his expectation of a universal style in 
newspapers. B’s Evaluation (more important,) realizes the act of Correction, a 
variant of Rejection. His evaluative concept a good, recognizable voice does not 
refer to some absolute value, and, aware of this he gives a local interpretation. 
What he calls a recognizable voice is specified with a metaphorical expression: 
doorstep English, and to ensure the appropriate interpretation of what he is 
trying to communicate he clarifies the meaning: the language of the people, the 
language the people spoke themselves. In the current context both the 
contextually Unspecific concept and its Specification describe the Real situation 
as a necessary counterpoint to what speaker A assumed in his Hypothetical 
proposition. 
The discourse attributes of the extract are in some respect similar to those 
of the first one above. The difference is in the emergence of the Unspecific–
Specific schema in the second speaker’s move here: 
 
Participant roles: Host = interviewer (A) Guest = interviewee (B) 
Contextually assumed 
intentions: 
Seeking information/ 
confirmation Giving information 
Discourse moves: Initiation Response 
Discourse functions of 
utterances: Elicitation 
Giving information/ 
confirmation 
Cognitive operations: Assumption Rejection (by Correction) 
Emerging discourse 
schemas: 
   Hypothetical — 
   Evaluation — 
    Real 
    Evaluation 
Unspecific—Specific 
 
Table 3. The discourse attributes of exchange (2) 
 
In the following discourse John Dunn’s special guest is Mike Batt, one of 
Britain’s best-known songwriters, composers and recording artists: 
 
(3) A1: …Now, how did you choose the tracks? 
B1: Just by discussion, really. There were some # tracks which 
Justin said [ə] I’d like to do these, and some which I said # and 
there often were # songs which# meant something to us 
personally, there might be songs which # one of us # would 
think ‘t would be nice to do this in a particular way having 
decided that we would do it with an orchestra and a valco. # 
And [ə\# so we just [ə\[ə\[ə] did this by discussion, I mean 
with this sort of # rang each other every night until one of us 
thought of another one. Everything. 
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A2: Could [əu] ended up with a very large album. 
B2: Yeah, we could [əu] done about ten albums, actually. 
 
In move A2 the speaker makes a realistic inference based partly on the details of 
what B tells him about his and his colleague’s approach to their preparation for 
their new record, partly on his original knowledge about his guest. The inference 
is realized in a Hypothetical unit, whose modal value is signalled by the irrealis 
could [əu]. The communicative value of the utterance, A’s intention, is 
interpreted by speaker B as need for confirmation and/or for further information. 
Response B2 starts with Yeah, which, on the surface, sounds like confirmation, 
i.e. like acceptance of A’s assumed proposition as true. In fact, it is followed by 
the correction of A’s hypothesis: about ten albums, actually, which assigns B’s 
utterance the function of Rejection. This meaning is emphasized by the 
attitudinal adverbial actually. In this context yeah means no; it is not an integral 
part of the correction; it is said to indicate that the speaker understands his 
partner’s meaning. Its function is, very plausibly, back-channelling. 
This discourse extract can also be analysed as an example of how 
vagueness is interpreted in certain local contexts of natural conversation. The 
concept of a very large album is rather vague in itself; its meaning is relative to 
contextual knowledge about the world of music. The meaning of the noun phrase 
about ten albums is similarly far from exact. For all this, its vagueness is not an 
obstacle to a plausible inference about the speaker’s intention. In this context the 
expression becomes relevant through its implicature: many more than enough 
for one large album. On the whole, in move B2 the speaker adds some clue for 
further inference: they had many more songs on the list than what appeared on 
the record. The exchange (A2–B2) shows the Hypothetical–Hypothetical schema 
emerging. 
5 Conclusions 
In this paper my goal was to give evidence of how the interpretation of the 
global and the local factors of the context contribute to the participants’ 
behaviour in their verbal interactions, as well as how the cognitive properties of 
discourse can be analysed. It has been demonstrated that the lexical signals of 
some cognitive factors of communication can be recognized through such 
discourse attributes as participant roles, contextually assumed intentions, 
discourse moves, the assumed functions of utterances and discourse schemas 
emerging in the communication. The investigation of the mental components of 
natural discourse via linguistic traces within the frames of Relevance Theory can 
also provide an explanation for how verbal interactions are controlled by such 
contextual factors as discourse schemata. 
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Abbreviations and symbols used in the discourse extracts 
A: speaker A’s move 
~A: speaker’s move is continued 
B: speaker B’s move 
B bch: speaker is back-channelling 
# : a short pause 
 parallel speech 
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